Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence

88 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2012 Last revised: 15 Jun 2017

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Miguel A. Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Beatriz Mariano

Cass Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 14, 2017

Abstract

We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new equity, and to decrease payout, operational risk and CEO cash compensation than firms without such appointments. We conclude that a firm's board composition, governance, and policies are shaped by current and past credit agreements.

Keywords: Corporate boards, Corporate governance, Covenant violations, Creditor intervention

JEL Classification: G21, G32, G33, G34

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Daniel and Ferreira, Miguel A. and Mariano, Beatriz, Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence (June 14, 2017). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 443/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021522

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Miguel Almeida Ferreira (Contact Author)

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Beatriz Mariano

Cass Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

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