81 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2012 Last revised: 26 Oct 2016
Date Written: October 24, 2016
We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors are linked to creditors. Firms with stronger lending relationships with their creditors appoint more new directors in response to covenant violations than firms without such relationships. Moreover, firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new equity and decrease CEO cash compensation than firms without such appointments. We conclude that a firm's board composition, governance, and policies are shaped by current and past credit agreements.
Keywords: Corporate boards, Corporate governance, Covenant violations, Creditor intervention
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G33, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ferreira, Daniel and Ferreira, Miguel A. and Mariano, Beatriz, Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence (October 24, 2016). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 443/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021522