Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade

CSGR Working Paper No. 44/99

25 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2000

See all articles by Raymond G. Riezman

Raymond G. Riezman

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics; University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics; University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); GEP; Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences

Date Written: October 1999

Abstract

There has been growing debate about whether bilateral trade agreements are damaging multilateral efforts to eliminate barriers to international trade. This paper develops a model in which trading blocks always charge optimal tariffs and make trade agreements based on strategic considerations. We ask a very simple question. Does the fact that trading blocs can form bilateral trade agreements make Free trade less likely to occur? The answer is that it depends on the size distribution of the trading blocs. If there is one large trading bloc along with some smaller ones then bilateral trade agreements allow the smaller trading blocs to coalesce and block the monopoly power of large trading blocs. In this case, bilateral trade agreements facilitate the attainment of free trade. Not allowing customs unions leads to more not less protection. If trading blocs are of roughly equivalent size then bilateral trade agreements allow groups of trading blocs to more effectively monopolize world trade in which case they may make free trade less likely. These results suggest that a policy that inhibits the formation of trading blocs may be harmful. We also compute the welfare effects of trade agreements to get some idea of how empirically important these issues are.

JEL Classification: F12, F13

Suggested Citation

Riezman, Raymond G., Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade (October 1999). CSGR Working Paper No. 44/99, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=202233 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.202233

Raymond G. Riezman (Contact Author)

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
Aarhus V, 8210
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/rriezman/

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

316 PBB
Iowa City, IA 52242
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/rriezman/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

GEP ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences ( email )

Nordre Ringgade 1
Aarhus C, DK-8000
Denmark

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