Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests

Posted: 25 Feb 2000

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

This article considers the interaction between two types of effort in lobbying contests: effort that improves the contestant's own performance (standard rent seeking), and effort that reduces particular rivals' performance (sabotage). Due to a positive externality, sabotage is a 'small number' phenomenon. Sabotage may increase lobbying efforts and the dissipation rate in lobbying contests compared to a situation in which sabotage is not feasible.

JEL Classification: D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (JLEO) Vol. 16:1, Spring 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=202353

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

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Germany

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, 53072
Germany

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