Determinants of Corporate Cash Policy: Insights from Private Firms

43 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2012 Last revised: 21 Feb 2013

See all articles by Huasheng Gao

Huasheng Gao

Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University

Jarrad Harford

University of Washington; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kai Li

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business; Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER); China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Canadian Sustainable Finance Network (CSFN)

Date Written: February 20, 2013

Abstract

We provide one of the first large sample comparisons of cash policies in public and private U.S. firms. We first show that despite higher financing frictions, private firms hold, on average, about half as much cash as public firms do. By examining the drivers of cash policies for each group, we are able to attribute the difference to the much higher agency costs in public firms. By combining evidence from across public and private firms as well as within public firms across different qualities of governance, we are able to reconcile existing mixed evidence on the effects of agency problems on cash policies. Specifically, agency problems affect not only the target level of cash, but also how managers react to cash in excess of the target.

Keywords: cash holdings, financing frictions, agency conflicts, private firms, excess cash, speed of adjustment

JEL Classification: G30, G32

Suggested Citation

Gao, Huasheng and Harford, Jarrad and Li, Kai, Determinants of Corporate Cash Policy: Insights from Private Firms (February 20, 2013). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2023999 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023999

Huasheng Gao

Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University ( email )

Beijing West District Baiyun Load 10th
Shanghai, 100045
China
2165642222 (Phone)
2165642222 (Fax)

Jarrad Harford (Contact Author)

University of Washington ( email )

Box 353226
Seattle, WA 98195-3226
United States
206-543-4796 (Phone)
206-543-7472 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.washington.edu/jarrad/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Kai Li

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada
604-822-8353 (Phone)
604-822-4695 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/kaili/home

Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

BIZ 2 Storey 4, 04-05
1 Business Link
Singapore, 117592
Singapore

China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR) ( email )

1954 Huashan Road
Shanghai P.R.China, 200030
China

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Canadian Sustainable Finance Network (CSFN) ( email )

Queens University
Kingston, ON
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://https://smith.queensu.ca/centres/isf/research/network.php

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