Post-Merger Integration Duration and Leverage Dynamics of Mergers: Theory and Evidence

58 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2012 Last revised: 1 Jun 2012

See all articles by Jing Huang

Jing Huang

University of South Carolina

Joshua R. Pierce

University of Alabama Culverhouse College of Commerce

Sergey Tsyplakov

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business

Date Written: March 15, 2012

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of the post-merger integration duration on acquiring firms’ leverage behavior around mergers, using a dynamic model in which full merger benefits cannot be consumed at the time of a merger, but rather after a pre-specified post-merger transition period that is associated with various integration costs. The model generates new implications pertaining to acquiring firms’ leverage dynamics in the immediate pre-and post-merger periods along with the method of payment choice. Specifically, the model indicates that acquiring firm managers who expect a longer integration duration choose a lower leverage ratio for the newly-merged firms and are more likely to finance such deals with equity. Also, firms tend to remain lower leveraged throughout the post-merger transition period when the remaining integration period is expected to be lengthy. Using 200 mergers between 1995 and 2007 in which we are able to create the post-merger integration duration variable, we provide strong empirical support for these model implications. Overall, our analysis offers new insight to understanding capital structure dynamics around mergers and provides an alternative explanation for the method of payment choice.

Keywords: leverage, post-merger integration duration, merger transition, method of payment

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Huang, Jing and Pierce, Joshua R. and Tsyplakov, Sergey, Post-Merger Integration Duration and Leverage Dynamics of Mergers: Theory and Evidence (March 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2024019 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024019

Jing Huang

University of South Carolina ( email )

Francis M. Hipp Building
1705 College Street
Columbia, SC South Carolina 29208
United States
803-556-9674 (Phone)

Joshua R. Pierce (Contact Author)

University of Alabama Culverhouse College of Commerce ( email )

101 Paul W. Bryant Dr.
Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Sergey Tsyplakov

University of South Carolina - Darla Moore School of Business ( email )

Francis M. Hipp Building
Finance Department
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-4669 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://dmsweb.moore.sc.edu/tsyplakov/

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