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The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Costs of Laws Limiting that Choice

29 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2000  

Asher Blass

Bank of Israel - Research Department

Dennis W. Carlton

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 1999

Abstract

This paper uses a new data source to analyze the choice of organizational form of retail gasoline stations. In recent years, gasoline stations have tended to be less likely to be owned and operated by a lessee dealer and more likely to be owned and operated by the refiner. Critics have alleged that company-operated stations are used to drive lessee dealer stations out of business in order to restrict competition. We examine the determinants of organizational form and find them to be based on efficiency not predatory concerns. We estimate the costs of recent laws prohibiting company ownership of gasoline stations.

Suggested Citation

Blass, Asher and Carlton , Dennis W., The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Costs of Laws Limiting that Choice (December 1999). NBER Working Paper No. w7435. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=202420

Asher Blass

Bank of Israel - Research Department ( email )

PO Box 780
Jerusalem 91007
Israel
+97 2 6552 600 (Phone)
+97 22 6552 660 (Fax)

Dennis W. Carlton (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
312-322-0215 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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