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Competition Policy, Patent Pools and Copyright Collectives

32 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2012  

Nancy Gallini

University of Toronto - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 31, 2011

Abstract

This paper analyzes and compares two types of cooperative agreements that combine Intellectual Property (IP): patent pools and copyright collectives. I evaluate antitrust policy in three environments in which owners of the intellectual property (IP): (1) are vertically integrated into the downstream (product) market; (2) face competition in the upstream (input) market and (3) own downstream products that do not require a license on the pooled IP but compete with products that do. Although patent pools and copyright collectives differ in purpose, membership size and market conditions, their efficiency implications are qualitatively similar in each of the three situations. Therefore, a uniform rather than IP-specific competition policy is appropriate for pools and collectives, thus lending economic support for the approach followed by antitrust authorities toward IP-related cooperative agreements.

Suggested Citation

Gallini, Nancy, Competition Policy, Patent Pools and Copyright Collectives (December 31, 2011). Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 3-34, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2024560

Nancy Gallini (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
Canada
416-978-8635 (Phone)
416-978-6713 (Fax)

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