The Dynamics of Power and Trust in the 'Slippery Slope Framework' and its Impact on the Tax Climate

27 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2012 Last revised: 14 Mar 2017

See all articles by Katharina Gangl

Katharina Gangl

University of Goettingen (Gottingen); Zeppelin University

Eva B. Hofmann

University of Vienna

Maria Pollai

University of Vienna

Erich Kirchler

University of Vienna - Faculty of Psychology

Date Written: March 16, 2012

Abstract

According to the Slippery Slope Framework (SSF; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008), tax compliance depends on the power of tax authorities and trust in the tax authorities. The framework, however, remains silent on the dynamics between power and trust, i.e., how power and trust increase or decrease each other, and how this affects the tax climate between authorities and taxpayers. The aim of the present paper is to differentiate power into coercive and legitimate power and to differentiate trust into reason-based and implicit trust to explicate the dynamics between power and trust. As a consequence of the described dynamics, the SSF is extended by adding a confidence climate to the antagonistic and service climate and a respective third form of cooperation (committed cooperation). Insights into the dynamics between power and trust may be utilized to change the tax climate from an antagonistic climate into a cooperative climate.

Keywords: power, trust, coercive power, legitimate power, tax behavior

JEL Classification: Fiscal Policy, Policy Making

Suggested Citation

Gangl, Katharina and Hofmann, Eva B. and Pollai, Maria and Kirchler, Erich, The Dynamics of Power and Trust in the 'Slippery Slope Framework' and its Impact on the Tax Climate (March 16, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2024946 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024946

Katharina Gangl (Contact Author)

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

Zeppelin University ( email )

Am Seemooser Horn 20
Friedrichshafen, Lake Constance 88045
Germany

Eva B. Hofmann

University of Vienna ( email )

Christies gate 12
Bergen, 5015
Austria
00431427747336 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/eva.hofmann/

Maria Pollai

University of Vienna ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

Erich Kirchler

University of Vienna - Faculty of Psychology ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 7
Vienna, A-1010
Austria
+43 1 42 7747332 (Phone)
+43 1 42 7747339 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/erich.kirchler

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