The Turn to Outsourcing in U.S. Intelligence

Simon Chesterman, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY, Oxford University Press, 2011

36 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2012

See all articles by Simon Chesterman

Simon Chesterman

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law

Date Written: March 18, 2012

Abstract

Though it lagged behind the privatization of military services, the privatization of intelligence expanded dramatically with the growth in intelligence activities following the September 11 attacks on the United States. Privatization of intelligence services raises many concerns familiar to the debates over private military and security companies (PMSCs). One of the key problems posed by PMSCs is their use of potentially lethal force in an environment where accountability may be legally uncertain and practically unlikely; in some circumstances, PMSCs may also affect the strategic balance of a conflict. The engagement of private actors in the collection of intelligence exacerbates the first set of problems: it frequently encompasses a far wider range of conduct that would normally be unlawful, with express or implied immunity from legal process, in an environment designed to avoid scrutiny. Engagement of such actors in analysis raises the second set of issues: top-level analysis is precisely intended to shape strategic policy — the more such tasks are delegated to private actors, the further they are removed from traditional accountability structures such as judicial and parliamentary oversight, and the more influence those actors may have on the executive.

Keywords: intelligence, national security, law, privatization, outsourcing, inherently governmental

Suggested Citation

Chesterman, Simon, The Turn to Outsourcing in U.S. Intelligence (March 18, 2012). Simon Chesterman, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY, Oxford University Press, 2011 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2025597

Simon Chesterman (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law ( email )

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HOME PAGE: www.SimonChesterman.com

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