Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study

Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study. Matthew J. Hashim, Karthik N. Kannan, and Sandra Maximiano. Information Systems Research 2017 (28:2) , 289-308. DOI: 10.1287/isre.2016.0663

44 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2012 Last revised: 20 Mar 2018

See all articles by Matthew J. Hashim

Matthew J. Hashim

University of Arizona

Karthik Natarajan Kannan

Purdue University

Sandra Maximiano

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Date Written: April 4, 2016

Abstract

There are many contexts where an "everybody else is doing it" attitude is relevant. We evaluate the impact of this attitude in a multi-threshold public goods game. We use a lab experiment to study the role of providing information about contribution behavior to targeted subsets of individuals, and its effect on coordination. Treatments include one in which no information is provided and three others that vary in whom we provide information to: a random sample of subjects; those whose contributions are below the average of their group, and those whose contributions are above the average of their group. We find that the random provision of information is no different than not providing information at all. More importantly, average contributions improve with targeted treatments. Coordination waste is also lower with targeted treatments. The insights from this research are relevant more broadly to contexts including piracy, open innovation, and crowdfunding.

Keywords: public goods, experimental economics, threshold, information, targeting, coordination, piracy

Suggested Citation

Hashim, Matthew J. and Kannan, Karthik Natarajan and Maximiano, Sandra, Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study (April 4, 2016). Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study. Matthew J. Hashim, Karthik N. Kannan, and Sandra Maximiano. Information Systems Research 2017 (28:2) , 289-308. DOI: 10.1287/isre.2016.0663, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2025686 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2025686

Matthew J. Hashim (Contact Author)

University of Arizona ( email )

Department of Management Information Systems
Eller College of Management
Tucson, AZ 85721
United States

Karthik Natarajan Kannan

Purdue University ( email )

Krannert School of Management
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

Sandra Maximiano

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

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