The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive Compensation

38 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2012

See all articles by Steven Balsam

Steven Balsam

Temple University - Department of Accounting

Jennifer Yin

University of Texas at San Antonio

Date Written: March 19, 2012

Abstract

We investigate the impact of say-on-pay on 2010 executive compensation, finding affected firms reduced compensation and made it more performance-based, with that decrease being greater for firms that previously overpaid their CEOs. We also find the percentage of votes cast against executive pay is lower when the firm reduced executive compensation in advance of the initial say-on-pay vote, but higher when the firm pays higher total compensation, has a large increase in compensation, has a larger amount of compensation that cannot be explained by economic factors, or has a higher amount of “other compensation,” a category which includes perquisites.

Keywords: Say-on-pay, Executive Compensation, Compensation Mix, Shareholder Voting

Suggested Citation

Balsam, Steven and Yin, Jennifer, The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive Compensation (March 19, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2026121 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2026121

Steven Balsam

Temple University - Department of Accounting ( email )

306 Speakman Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-5574 (Phone)
215-204-5587 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sbm.temple.edu/~drb/

Jennifer Yin (Contact Author)

University of Texas at San Antonio ( email )

Department of Accounting
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
210-458-7090 (Phone)
210-458-4322 (Fax)

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