Not Available for Download

Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs

Posted: 20 Mar 2012  

Sonja Brangewitz

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

Jan Philip Gamp

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

Date Written: August 29, 2011

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining games with complete information. We show that the set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set are strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every bargaining game is a market game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude that for every possible vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists an economy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector. We relate the literature of Trockel (1996, 2005) with the ideas of Qin (1993). Our result can be seen as a market foundation for every asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in analogy to the results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games.

Keywords: Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution, Competitive Payoffs, Market Games

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D51

Suggested Citation

Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan Philip, Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs (August 29, 2011). Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 453. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2026223

Sonja Brangewitz (Contact Author)

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

Jan Philip Gamp

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
288