Mutual Fund Agency Conflicts

John A. Haslem

University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business

July 16, 2012

The purpose of this study is to discuss various types of agency conflicts that negatively impact mutual fund shareholder interests. In so doing, shareholders should get an improved understanding of conflicts that place them at such a disadvantage in fund investing.

Many fund advisers are motivated to use each available agency conflict to their advantage. But, even if not, conflicts in the Investment Company Act of 1940, adverse court decisions, and the 2003 fund scandal have done quite enough harm to shareholders. Also, several major findings of fund agency conflicts with shareholders are discussed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: mutual funds, agency conflicts, ICA, shareholder interests, in-depth findings

JEL Classification: G2, G23, G28

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Date posted: March 21, 2012 ; Last revised: October 14, 2012

Suggested Citation

Haslem, John A., Mutual Fund Agency Conflicts (July 16, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2026561 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2026561

Contact Information

John A. Haslem (Contact Author)
University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business ( email )
College Park, MD 20742
United States
202-387 2025 (Phone)
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