The Political Economies of Immigration Law
UC Irvine Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 101, 2012
90 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2012 Last revised: 31 Aug 2020
Date Written: April 17, 2012
A largely dysfunctional American immigration system is only poorly explained by deliberate economic policy choices, longstanding public attitudes, explicit presidential decisions, or general gridlock. Instead of being accurately described by simple depictions of the political economy of the issue, immigration law's structure can be better appreciated by analyzing the intersecting effects of three separate dynamics — statutory compromises rooted in the political economy of lawmaking, organizational practices reflecting the political economy of implementation, and public reactions implicating the responses of policy elites and the larger public to each other. Together, these factors help constitute an immigration status quo characterized by intense public concern, continuing legal controversies, and powerful obstacles to change. For example, American immigration statutes — particularly since 1986 — have created a legal arrangement essentially built to fail, giving authorities regulatory responsibilities that were all but impossible to achieve under existing law. Meanwhile, implementation has been characterized by organizational fragmentation, with policy changes involving one agency often producing externalities not affecting that agency, and limited presidential power to change many of the core elements of the framework governing immigration in the United States. Beyond what these developments tell us about immigration, they also reveal much about how statutory entrenchment in the United States is affected by political cycles capable of eroding the legitimacy of public agencies, and how powerful nation-states control, in limited but nonetheless significant ways, the transnational flows affecting their well-being and security.
Keywords: Immigration and citizenship law, Immigration and Nationality Act, statutory entrenchment, policy feedback, organizations, executive power, transnational flows, political economy of discretion
JEL Classification: H11, D20, J61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation