Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft

46 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2000  

Ronald A. Cass

Center for the Rule of Law; Cass & Associates, PC; Boston University School of Law; Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason School of Law

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

In a recent symposium issue of the George Mason Law Review, Steven Salop and R. Craig Romaine use the Microsoft litigation as a focus for discussion of antitrust law. Salop and Romaine argue that each of the allegations against Microsoft could constitute evidence of a design by Microsoft to reduce competition and to preserve or extend monopoly power. They argue as well that the right legal standard to apply in monopolization cases is a "competitive effects" test that balances the benefits and harms of the monopolist's conduct. This article exposes problems with their approach, explains why it departs from current antitrust standards, and urges an approach consistent with current standards.

Suggested Citation

Cass, Ronald A. and Hylton, Keith N., Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft (1999). George Mason Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1999. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=202738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.202738

Ronald A. Cass

Center for the Rule of Law ( email )

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Cass & Associates, PC ( email )

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Boston University School of Law ( email )

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Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason School of Law

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Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

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Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

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