A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 127-170, 1999
Columbia Law School, Center for Studies in Law & Economics Paper No. 131, November 1999
41 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2000 Last revised: 26 Apr 2009
Date Written: October 1, 1999
Abstract
Corporate structures differ among the advanced economies of the world. We contribute to an understanding of these differences by developing a theory of the path dependence of corporate structure. The corporate structures that an economy has at any point in time depend in part on those that it had at earlier times. Two sources of path dependence--structure driven and rule driven--are identified and analyzed. First, the corporate structures of an economy depend on the structures with which the economy started. Initial ownership structures have such an effect because they affect the identity of the structure that would be efficient for any given company and because they can give some parties both incentives and power to impede changes in them. Second, corporate rules, which affect ownership structures, will themselves depend on the corporate structures with which the economy started. Initial ownership structures can affect both the identity of the rules that would be efficient and the interest group politics that can determine which rules would actually be chosen. Our theory of path dependence sheds light on why the advanced economies, despite pressures to converge, vary in their ownership structures. It also provides a basis for why some important differences might persist.
JEL Classification: G3, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Political Economy of Corporate Governance
By Marco Pagano and Paolo F. Volpin
-
Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? a Test Using Takeover Legislation
-
Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control
By Paolo F. Volpin and Marco Pagano
-
Managers, Workers and Corporate Control
By Marco Pagano and Paolo F. Volpin
-
Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on Contract Wages
-
Class Struggle Inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination
By Gary B. Gorton and Frank A. Schmid
-
Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance
By Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe
-
Corporate Contracting Around Defective Regulations: The Daimler-Chrysler Case