Download This PaperCo-Ranking Mates: Assortative Matching in Marriage Markets
6 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2012
Date Written: November 11, 2009
Abstract
We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition in Legros and Newman (2007) and is a weakening of the existing conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.
Keywords: nontransferable, utility, assignment, models
JEL Classification: C7, D1
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Legros, Patrick and Newman, Andrew F., Co-Ranking Mates: Assortative Matching in Marriage Markets (November 11, 2009). Economics Letters, Vol. 106, Issue 3, pp. 177-179, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2028539
Register to save articles to
your library
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.
