Co-Ranking Mates: Assortative Matching in Marriage Markets

6 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2012

See all articles by Patrick Legros

Patrick Legros

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Northeastern University, department of economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 11, 2009

Abstract

We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition in Legros and Newman (2007) and is a weakening of the existing conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.

Keywords: nontransferable, utility, assignment, models

JEL Classification: C7, D1

Suggested Citation

Legros, Patrick and Newman, Andrew F., Co-Ranking Mates: Assortative Matching in Marriage Markets (November 11, 2009). Economics Letters, Vol. 106, Issue 3, pp. 177-179, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2028539

Patrick Legros (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4219/3 (Phone)
+32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Northeastern University, department of economics ( email )

301 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Andrew F. Newman

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-4354 (Phone)
617-353-4143 (Fax)

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