Revisiting the Objectives of Worker-Managed Firms: An Empirical Assessment

Posted: 26 Mar 2012

See all articles by Gabriel Burdin

Gabriel Burdin

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Andrés Dean

Universidad de la Republica - Instituto de Economía

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

This paper provides new evidence on the objectives pursued by worker-managed firms (WMFs). The basic neoclassical model assumes that WMFs maximize net income per member instead of total profits (Ward, 1958). Even though it has been largely criticized, the Ward model has dominated the self-management literature. Alternative models suggest that WMFs are not only concerned about income per worker but also about the level of employment. However, the empirical content of these competing theoretical models has rarely been analyzed. This paper contributes to fill this gap by estimating the parameters of a generic welfare function following the methodology proposed by Craig and Pencavel (1993). These parameters determine the relative importance that a WMF places on income per worker vis-à-vis the level of employment. Estimates are based on a long micro-panel of Uruguayan firms covering the entire population of Uruguayan worker-managed firms and conventional firms in 31 3-digit sectors over the period April 1996 to December 2005. Following a strictly neoclassical framework, but simply allowing a more general specification of the WMF goals, we show that the assumption of the basic neoclassical model of the WMF is misleading. Our results support the view that WMFs are concerned with both employment and income per worker.

Keywords: Capitalist firms, Worker cooperatives, Firm objectives

JEL Classification: J54, D21

Suggested Citation

Burdin, Gabriel and Dean, Andrés, Revisiting the Objectives of Worker-Managed Firms: An Empirical Assessment (2012). Economic Systems, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029117

Gabriel Burdin

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Andrés Dean (Contact Author)

Universidad de la Republica - Instituto de Economía ( email )

Uruguay

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