Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions

27 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2012

See all articles by Ginger Zhe Jin

Ginger Zhe Jin

University of Maryland - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Marc Rysman

Boston University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2012

Abstract

We study a new data set of US sports card conventions in order to evaluate the pricing theory of two-sided markets. Conventions are two-sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers. We have detailed information on consumer price, dealer price and, since most conventions are local, the market structure for conventions. We present several findings: first, consumer pricing decreases with competition at any reasonable distance, but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition. Second, when consumer price is zero (and thus constrained), dealer price decreases more strongly with competition. These results are compatible with existing models of two-sided markets, but are difficult to explain without such models.

Suggested Citation

Jin, Ginger Zhe and Rysman, Marc, Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions (March 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w17959. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2031967

Ginger Zhe Jin (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3484 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Marc Rysman

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-3086 (Phone)
617-353-4449 (Fax)

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