Outcome, Process & Power in Direct Democracy New Econometric Results

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 25, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 222

30 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2000

See all articles by Bruno S. Frey

Bruno S. Frey

CREMA; University of Basel

Marcel Kucher

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Alois Stutzer

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 1999

Abstract

Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empirical findings on direct democracy are presented. In the first part, we show that, on average, public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats are more constrained in direct democracies and have to be compensated by higher wages for that loss of power. In the second part, we demonstrate that reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in jurisdictions with stronger direct democratic rights. This is not only the case because people value political outcomes higher but they derive utility from the politcal process itself.

Keywords: Direct democracy, power, compensating wage differentials, satisfaction with life, process utility

JEL Classification: H73, I31, J45, J32

Suggested Citation

Frey, Bruno S. and Kucher, Marcel and Stutzer, Alois, Outcome, Process & Power in Direct Democracy New Econometric Results (December 1999). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 25, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 222. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=203329

Bruno S. Frey

CREMA ( email )

Südstrasse 11
Zurich, CH 8008
Switzerland
+41 44 380 00 78 (Phone)

University of Basel ( email )

Peter Merian-Weg 6
Basel, 4002
Switzerland

Marcel Kucher

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 37 32 (Phone)
+41 1 634 49 07 (Fax)

Alois Stutzer (Contact Author)

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Peter Merian-Weg 6
4002 Basel
Switzerland
0041 61 267 3361 (Phone)
0041 61 267 3340 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/stutzer/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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