Quitting and Peer Effects at Work

GATE Working Paper No. 1204

57 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2012 Last revised: 23 Dec 2015

See all articles by Julie Rosaz

Julie Rosaz

French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA)

Robert Slonim

The University of Sydney; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

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Date Written: December 22, 2015

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of peers on the extensive margin of effort at work by means of a real-effort experiment in which subjects have to decide on the intensity of effort and when to stop working. Participants perform a task alone or in the presence of a peer. The feedback on the co-worker’s output is manipulated and we vary whether the two workers can communicate. We find that when communication is allowed, the average productivity per unit of time and the quitting time are not increased but the presence of a peer causes workers to stay longer and to quit at more similar times. Peer effects on the extensive margin of effort derive more from a sociability effect, i.e. a reduction of the social distance between co-workers that could make the other’s presence more valuable, than from performance or quitting time comparisons.

Keywords: quits, peer effects, communication, feedback, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, D83, J63, J28, J81

Suggested Citation

Rosaz, Julie and Slonim, Robert and Villeval, Marie Claire, Quitting and Peer Effects at Work (December 22, 2015). GATE Working Paper No. 1204. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2033653 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2033653

Julie Rosaz (Contact Author)

French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA) ( email )

France

Robert Slonim

The University of Sydney ( email )

University of Sydney
Sydney, NC NSW 2006
Australia

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/equipe/perso/villeval/villeval.html

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

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