Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets

Posted: 22 Feb 2000

See all articles by James D. Cox

James D. Cox

Duke University School of Law


Due to globalization, the world is a much smaller place today than it was when the U.S. securities laws were enacted. In an era of global trading and offerings of securities disclosure policy for U.S. securities markets is formulated with a healthy respect for the rules, customs and practices of foreign markets. Thus, for policy makers, regulatory competition is as important a strategy as is harmonization. Theorists have long embraced the view that regulatory competition among markets will result in a regulatory hierarchy that is optimal for investors and the issuers of securities. In this article, Professor Cox takes the regulatory hierarchy paradigm to the next analytical level. He considers the policy implications of diverse regulatory standards within a single market, focusing much of his analysis on the significant issue presently confronting the SEC: Whether its registrants should be permitted to satisfy the mandatory disclosure requirements by using International Accounting Standards.

Suggested Citation

Cox, James D., Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, P. 1200, 1999. Available at SSRN:

James D. Cox (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7056 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

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