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More Thoughts on the Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote: A Response to Professor Hendricks

Election Law Journal, Vol. 7, p. 227, 2008

6 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2012  

Derek T. Muller

Pepperdine University - School of Law; University of Iowa - College of Law

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

This article briefly responds to three of the more salient issues noted by Professor Hendricks in her article "Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218 (2008). First, I establish that the Supreme Court actually would enforce the requirement of congressional consent for the Compact under its current jurisprudence according to the "Political Consent" Compact Clause. Second, I define a "political compact," not merely in terms of the topic or type of the compact, but in terms of its function as a compact that tends to enlarge the power of some states at the expense of others. Under this definition, the National Popular Vote (NPV) is a political compact because it shifts political power among presidential electors across states. Third, I conclude that the Compact, which ostensibly designates the procedure that participating states will use to appoint their presidential electors, actually affects the political power of non-compacting states.

Keywords: compact clause, national popular vote, political compact, political consent, electors, president, election

Suggested Citation

Muller, Derek T., More Thoughts on the Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote: A Response to Professor Hendricks (2008). Election Law Journal, Vol. 7, p. 227, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2033853

Derek T. Muller (Contact Author)

Pepperdine University - School of Law ( email )

24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
United States
310-506-7058 (Phone)

University of Iowa - College of Law ( email )

Melrose and Byington
Iowa City, IA 52242
United States

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