Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation

Posted: 13 Mar 2000

See all articles by Gary Biglaiser

Gary Biglaiser

University of North Carolina

Claudio Mezzetti

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Economics

Abstract

We study an incentive auction in which multiple principals bid for the exclusive services, or effort, of a single agent. Each principal has private information about her valuation for these services, and the agent has private information about his disutility of providing them. We characterize the equilibrium of this auction and examine the agent's incentives to reveal information about his type. We show that the effort level taken by the agent is smaller than in the standard auction for a known agent type and greater than in the single-principal, single-agent model.

JEL Classification: D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Biglaiser, Gary and Mezzetti, Claudio, Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=203389

Gary Biglaiser (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States
919-966-4884 (Phone)
919-966-4986 (Fax)

Claudio Mezzetti

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Economics ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States
919-966-5377 (Phone)
919-966-4986 (Fax)

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