51 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2012 Last revised: 24 Feb 2013
Date Written: April 6, 2012
Congress believes it has plenary authority to limit the inherent power of federal courts to police their own final judgments for fraud by a court officer. Surprisingly, some lower courts agree and have recently interpreted a federal statute in a way that restricts traditionally inherent judgment-relief powers. Both Congress and the courts are wrong. Their error stems from confusion about the scope of Article III 'judicial power' and the so-called inherent powers necessary to support it. The resulting ill-considered abrogation of federal court power sheds light on broader questions regarding the scope of judicial power and Congress’s ability to limit it.
The propriety of any congressional restriction on a so-called inherent power should be analyzed through a two-step framework. First, courts should determine whether the power is absolutely essential to the exercise of the core, or irreducible nucleus, of Article III judicial power. If the power is not essential to support judicial power, Congress has plenary authority to abolish or limit it. Second, assuming the power is essential, courts should determine whether the statute restricting it prevents the full exercise of core Article III judicial power. If so, Congress has exceeded its power.
Based on this analysis, several traditional inherent powers are beyond Congress’s reach, including the direct contempt power, the power to take evidence and develop a factual record, and the power to vacate judgments for fraud on the court. Notably, the fraud on the court power provides courts with an essential tool to remedy litigation wrongs ranging from bribing a federal judge to creating false documents or other evidence.
And while the outer parameters of core judicial power are notoriously difficult to locate, some so-called inherent powers are plainly not necessary for courts to exercise even the most expansive view of the power. These include the power to dismiss cases for forum non conveniens and the power to dismiss cases for want of prosecution.
Keywords: Article III, Rule 60(b), Rule 60, Rule 60(d), fraud on the court, habeas, AEDPA, inherent power, judicial power
JEL Classification: K00, K10, K40, K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Benham, Dustin B., Beyond Congress's Reach: Constitutional Aspects of Inherent Power (April 6, 2012). Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 43, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2035548