Who Gets What from Employer Pay or Play Mandates?

28 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2012

See all articles by Richard V. Burkhauser

Richard V. Burkhauser

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis & Management (PAM); University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute

Kosali Ilayperuma Simon

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: Spring 2008

Abstract

Critics of pay or play mandates, borrowing from the large empirical minimum wage literature, argue that they reduce employment. Borrowing from a smaller empirical minimum wage literature, we argue that they also are a blunt instrument for funding health insurance for the working poor. The vast majority of those who benefit from pay or play mandates, which require employers to either provide appropriate health insurance for their workers or pay a flat per hour tax to offset the cost of health care live in families with incomes twice the poverty line or more, and depending on how coverage is determined, the mandate will leave a significant share of the working poor ineligible for such benefits either because their hourly wage rate is too high or they work for smaller exempt firms.

Suggested Citation

Burkhauser, Richard V. and Simon, Kosali Ilayperuma, Who Gets What from Employer Pay or Play Mandates? (Spring 2008). Risk Management and Insurance Review, Vol. 11, Issue 1, pp. 75-102, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2036131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6296.2008.00131.x

Richard V. Burkhauser (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis & Management (PAM) ( email )

120 Martha Van Rensselaer Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
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University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
161 Barry Street
Carlton, VIC 3053
Australia

Kosali Ilayperuma Simon

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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