The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property: What Consequences for the European Union?

In: J. Rosén (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroads of Trade, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2012, pp. 167-181

Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-04

15 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2012 Last revised: 24 Feb 2017

Date Written: April 12, 2012

Abstract

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the secrecy of its negotiation process have given rise to widespread speculation on the content and the objectives of the Agreement, leading to the development of considerable mistrust among the general public. This article concentrates on one of the most problematic aspects of the Agreement: the provisions on criminal enforcement. It will first show why criminal enforcement of intellectual property is generally a problematic issue, especially in the European Union, and then briefly try to demonstrate why ACTA is not the right answer in this regard, since criminal enforcement provisions clearly need a differentiated approach, an approach which is not reflected in the Agreement.

Keywords: ACTA, enforcement of intellectual Property, criminal law, European Union, directive proposal on criminal enforcement, TRIPS, WTO Panel Report of 26 January 2009

Suggested Citation

Geiger, Christophe, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property: What Consequences for the European Union? (April 12, 2012). In: J. Rosén (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroads of Trade, Cheltenham, Elgar, 2012, pp. 167-181; Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2038272

Christophe Geiger (Contact Author)

Université de Strasbourg - CEIPI ( email )

11 fue de Marechal Juin
BP68
Strasbourg
France

HOME PAGE: www.ceipi.edu

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