Why Do Education Vouchers Fail at the Ballot Box?

FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2011-032B

27 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2012 Last revised: 7 Nov 2012

See all articles by Peter Bearse

Peter Bearse

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Economics

Buly A. Cardak

La Trobe University - School of Economics

Gerhard Glomm

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

B. Ravikumar

Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis

Date Written: August 1, 2012

Abstract

We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribution of welfare gains and losses across house-holds by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not sufficiently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.

Suggested Citation

Bearse, Peter and Cardak, Buly and Glomm, Gerhard and Ravikumar, B., Why Do Education Vouchers Fail at the Ballot Box? (August 1, 2012). FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2011-032B. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2038876 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2038876

Peter Bearse (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Economics ( email )

Greensboro, NC 27402-6165
United States

Buly Cardak

La Trobe University - School of Economics ( email )

Bundoora
Bundoora, Victoria 3083 3086
Australia
+61 3 9479 3419 (Phone)
+61 3 9479 1654 (Fax)

Gerhard Glomm

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
812-855-7256 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

B. Ravikumar

Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis ( email )

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

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