The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions
2013, In 'Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes', eds., Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, Cambridge University Press
43 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2012 Last revised: 22 Nov 2016
Date Written: April 14, 2012
Abstract
Why do autocrats adopt constitutions? Constitutions can help dictators consolidate power, increase investment, and boost economic development — all while generating a steady flow of rents for themselves and their cronies without empowering challengers so as to undermine their authority. Autocratic constitutions play a crucial role in consolidating the inner ranks of the autocratic regime by fostering loyalty and trust between the dictator and his launching organization (LO) early in the regime, when uncertainty about the dictator’s intentions is considerable and the LO’s de facto power is at its height. One key function of autocratic constitutions is to consolidate a new distribution of power. To accomplish this, autocratic constitutions may outline limits on executive authority, codify individual rights and political obligations and, given the right conditions, impose constraints on executive authority. We test this theoretical framework on a panel dataset of Latin American dictators between 1950 and 2002. We find that the creation of a constitution under dictatorship can enable an autocratic coalition to co-opt threats to their rule and last longer in office, a finding that holds even after controlling for country fixed effects, other possible indirect institutional pathways and after instrumenting autocratic constitutions with constituent assembly elections held prior to constitutional promulgation. Employing the same robustness checks, we also find that autocratic constitutions are associated with stronger property rights protection, higher rates of private investment, and economic growth.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships
By Carles Boix and Milan Svolik
-
By Scott Gehlbach and Philip Keefer
-
Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes
By Milan Svolik
-
Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off
By Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin
-
Inequality and Democratization
By Ben W. Ansell and David J. Samuels
-
Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975-2004
By Gary W. Cox
-
By Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov
-
Policy Uncertainty in Hybrid Regimes - Evidence from Firm Level Surveys
By Thomas Kenyon and Megumi Naoi