No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time

37 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2012

See all articles by Rashmi Barua

Rashmi Barua

Singapore Management University - Department of Economics

Marian Vidal-Fernandez

IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor; The University of Sydney - School of Economics

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Abstract

Do negative incentives or sticks in education improve student outcomes? Since the late 1980s, several U.S. states have introduced No Pass No Drive (NPND) laws that set minimum academic requirements for teenagers to obtain driving licenses. Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and Monitoring the Future (MTF), we exploit variation across state, time, and cohort to show that NPND laws led to a 6.4 percentage point increase in the probability of graduating from high school among black males. Further, we show that NPND laws were effective in reducing truancy and increased time allocated to school-work at the expense of leisure and work.

Keywords: negative incentives, education, allocation of time, dropout, No Pass No Drive laws

JEL Classification: J08, J22, I2

Suggested Citation

Barua, Rashmi and Vidal-Fernandez, Marian and Vidal-Fernandez, Marian, No Pass No Drive: Education and Allocation of Time. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6464, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2039650 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2039650

Rashmi Barua (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - Department of Economics ( email )

90 Stamford Road
178903
Singapore

Marian Vidal-Fernandez

The University of Sydney - School of Economics ( email )

Rm 370 Merewether (H04)
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006 2008
Australia

IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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