River Sharing and Water Trade

24 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2012

See all articles by Erik Ansink

Erik Ansink

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Michael Gengenbach

Wageningen UR

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 16, 2012

Abstract

We analyze river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Keywords: river sharing, water trade, market emergence, property rights, coalition stability

JEL Classification: C72, D74, H23, Q25

Suggested Citation

Ansink, Erik and Gengenbach, Michael and Weikard, Hans-Peter, River Sharing and Water Trade (April 16, 2012). FEEM Working Paper No. 17.2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040633 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2040633

Erik Ansink (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

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Netherlands

Michael Gengenbach

Wageningen UR ( email )

Hollandseweg 1
6706KN
Netherlands

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences ( email )

De Leeuwenborch
Hollandseweg 1
6706 KN Wageningen
Netherlands
+31 317 48 24 94 (Phone)
+31 317 48 49 33 (Fax)

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