Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040858
 


 



A Remedy for Soaring Executive Pay: Focus Less on it


Simon C. Y. Wong


Northwestern University School of Law; London School of Economics; McKinsey & Co. Inc.

2012

Harvard Business Review Online, March 2012

Abstract:     
This article argues that the increasing focus on pay by policymakers, shareholders, and the media has magnified its importance as a gauge of success for top executives and created a vicious cycle of ever-higher pay demands. It suggests ways for policymakers, shareholders, and boards of directors to de-emphasize monetary incentives, with the view to moderating the rapid ascent of executive compensation.

The author subsequently published an expanded version of this article in The Conference Board Review in April 2012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040868.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 2

Keywords: executive pay, compensation, financial incentives, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J33, M52


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Date posted: April 16, 2012 ; Last revised: May 7, 2012

Suggested Citation

Wong, Simon C. Y., A Remedy for Soaring Executive Pay: Focus Less on it (2012). Harvard Business Review Online, March 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040858

Contact Information

Simon C. Y. Wong (Contact Author)
Northwestern University School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/simon-wong.htm

McKinsey & Co. Inc. ( email )
1 Jermyn Street
London, England SW1Y 4UH
United Kingdom
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