Dim the Spotlight

The Conference Board Review, April 2012

4 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2012 Last revised: 7 May 2012

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

This article argues that the increasing focus on pay by policymakers, shareholders, and the media has magnified its importance as a gauge of success for top executives and created a vicious cycle of ever-higher pay demands. It suggests ways for policymakers, shareholders, and boards of directors to de-emphasize monetary incentives, with the view to moderating the rapid ascent of executive compensation.

This article is an expanded version of the March 2012 Harvard Business Review Online commentary, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040858.

Keywords: executive pay, compensation, financial incentives, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J33, M52

Suggested Citation

Wong, Simon C. Y., Dim the Spotlight (2012). The Conference Board Review, April 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040868

Simon C. Y. Wong (Contact Author)

Northwestern University School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

London School of Economics

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/simon-wong.htm

Tapestry Networks ( email )

404 Wyman St.
Suite 225
Waltham, MA 02451
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
44
Abstract Views
724
PlumX Metrics