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Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company Executives

11 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 383 (2009)

44 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2012 Last revised: 8 Oct 2013

Tom C. W. Lin

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act. Advocates that favor more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many legitimate arguments and concerns. This article argues that when viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role of the executive, and the modern media, additional disclosure from executives about material, private matters is desirable. In support of this argument, this article proposes a principle-based approach for executive disclosure that affords companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and how to disclose it, while simultaneously strengthening regulatory safeguards for the investing public with minimal compliance burdens.

Keywords: corporate law, securities regulations, disclosure, privacy, executive, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Lin, Tom C. W., Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company Executives (2009). 11 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 383 (2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2040940

Tom C. W. Lin (Contact Author)

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law ( email )

1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.temple.edu/contact/tom-lin/

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