60 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2012
Date Written: April 12, 2012
We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm-level and country-level corporate governance are substitutes in writing and enforcing financial contracts. We also find that the distinctiveness of borrowers’ characteristics affect the relation between firm-level corporate governance and loan contracting terms. Our findings are robust, irrespective of types of regression methods and specifications.
Keywords: corporate governance, financial contracts, emerging markets
JEL Classification: G20, G30, G31, G34, G38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Francis, Bill B. and Hasan, Iftekhar and Song, Liang, Are Firm- and Country-Specific Governance Substitutes? Evidence from Financial Contracts in Emerging Markets (April 12, 2012). Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 12/2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2041236 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2041236