Do Rent‐Seeking Groups Announce Their Sharing Rules?

16 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2012

See all articles by Kyung Hwan Baik

Kyung Hwan Baik

Sungkyunkwan University

Dongryul Lee

Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST)

Date Written: April 2012

Abstract

We study collective rent seeking between two groups in which each group has the option of releasing or not its sharing‐rule information. First, we show that the case where both groups release their sharing‐rule information never occurs in equilibrium; when the players are unevenly matched, one group releases its sharing‐rule information and the other does not. Then, we select the Pareto‐superior equilibrium when the players are unevenly matched. We show that, in this selected equilibrium, the underdog releases its sharing‐rule information, and the favorite does not; thus, the underdog becomes the leader, and the favorite the follower.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Baik, Kyung Hwan and Lee, Dongryul, Do Rent‐Seeking Groups Announce Their Sharing Rules? (April 2012). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 50, Issue 2, pp. 348-363, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2042364 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00280.x

Kyung Hwan Baik (Contact Author)

Sungkyunkwan University ( email )

Department of Economics
Seoul, 110-745
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)
+82-2-760-0432 (Phone)
+82-2-744-5717 (Fax)

Dongryul Lee

Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST) ( email )

gil 50
Ulsan, 689-798
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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