The Political Economy of Carbon Trading

Posted: 20 Apr 2012

See all articles by Forest L. Reinhardt

Forest L. Reinhardt

Harvard Business School

Gunnar Trumbull

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mikell Hyman

Harvard University

Patia McGrath

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Nazli Uludere

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: April 27, 2011

Abstract

Global climate change is an increasingly prominent political and business problem. Design of market-based systems to reduce carbon emissions has proven difficult. More broadly, national attempts to comply with the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol present both governments and firms with significant challenges. The design of international institutions that will be useful for managing change after the Kyoto period is a challenge both for Kyoto ratifiers and for countries like the United States that have not ratified the agreement. Creation of a post-Kyoto treaty on climate change requires agreement by China and the United States, the world's largest carbon emitters. The case summarizes the science and economics of climate change and encourages readers to contemplate the strategic and risk management problems that it presents to government officials and to business leaders in developed countries and in the developing world.

Suggested Citation

Reinhardt, Forest L. and Trumbull, Gunnar and Hyman, Mikell and McGrath, Patia and Uludere, Nazli, The Political Economy of Carbon Trading (April 27, 2011). Harvard Business School BGIE Unit Case No. 710-056. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2042629

Forest L. Reinhardt (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States
617-495-6610 (Phone)

Gunnar Trumbull

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Mikell Hyman

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Patia McGrath

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Nazli Uludere

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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