36 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2012 Last revised: 14 Aug 2017
Date Written: August 13, 2017
The economy of a state (‘dependent state’) may depend relatively more upon the economy of another, less dependent, state (‘dominant state’) than vice versa. This paper explains why the ‘dominant economy’ can wield leverage over the issue of which legal rules to include in a uniform commercial law. In the preparation of a uniform commercial law, the ‘dependent state’ looks more likely to make the tradeoff between increased interstate economic activity and applying less-preferred legal rules. Within the conceptual framework of historical and comparative institutional analysis (HCIA), an empirical study is offered of several well-known attempts to unify (and codify) divergent bodies of commercial (common) law in the past two centuries.
Keywords: New Institutional Economics, Transaction Cost Economics, Contracting Institutions, Commercial Law, Unification of Law, Uniform State Law, Cooperative Federalism, Coordination, Economic Dominance
JEL Classification: D61, D63, D72, H70, H73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation