Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Legal Emulation between Regulatory Competition and Comparative Law

35 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2012 Last revised: 5 Jun 2012

Pierre Larouche

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); College of Europe - Bruges; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School; Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Date Written: April 23, 2012

Abstract

This paper puts forward an alternative path, next to regulatory competition models and comparative law endeavors, called legal emulation. Regulatory competition suffers from its very restrictive assumptions, which make it a relatively rare occurrence in practice. It is also endogenously driven, ignoring legal change brought about from within the law, and it takes an impoverished view of law. As for comparative law, it has tended to remain mostly mono-disciplinary. It usually lacks a dynamic dimension. Legal emulation tries to combine the more dynamic perspective of regulatory competition, with the endogeneity of comparative law. It rests on a theoretical perspective whereby the law is conceived as the outcome of a series of choices – substantive or institutional, fundamental or transient – made between different options (legal science would then be the investigation of the set of those choices). The paper provides an outline of the legal emulation model. Legal emulation ties together and explains a number of existing phenomena in many legal orders, such as constitutional, EU or human rights review; impact assessment; peer review within networks of authorities; or the open method of coordination. Finally, the paper outlines some consequences of adopting a legal emulation model.

Keywords: Regulatory competition, comparative law, functionalist method, comparative law and economics, legal emulation

JEL Classification: K00, K10, L51

Suggested Citation

Larouche, Pierre, Legal Emulation between Regulatory Competition and Comparative Law (April 23, 2012). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2044679 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2044679

Pierre Larouche (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)

College of Europe - Bruges ( email )

Dijver 11
B-8000 Brugge, Oost Vlanderen 10000
Belgium

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law School ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Montesquieu Building, Room M 535
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31.13.466.8270 (Phone)

Center on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) ( email )

Rue de l'Industrie 42
Brussels, 1040
Belgium

Paper statistics

Downloads
278
Rank
93,525
Abstract Views
2,996