On the Merits of Meritocracy

45 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2012

See all articles by John Morgan

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

Dana Sisak

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Felix Várdy

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: April 25, 2012

Abstract

We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful.

Suggested Citation

Morgan, John and Sisak, Dana and Várdy, Felix, On the Merits of Meritocracy (April 25, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045954 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2045954

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-2669 (Phone)
810-885-5959 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/

Dana Sisak

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Felix Várdy (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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