How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy
32 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2012
Date Written: April 25, 2012
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who seeks the firm’s investment votes for the policy, though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy. Moreover, when votes reveal information about the district, the firm’s implicit promise or threat can be credible. Unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes, the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the observed small spending by special interests.
Keywords: lobbying, voting, special interests, credibility
JEL Classification: D720, D780
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation