Pyres, Haircuts, and CACs: Lessons from Greco-Multilateralism for Creditors

25 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2012 Last revised: 17 May 2012

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos

Indiana University - Robert H. McKinney School of Law

Date Written: May 15, 2012

Abstract

The restructuring of Greece’s debt offers a clean case study of the dynamics of sovereign restructuring. This essay discusses the powerlessness of sovereign creditors, Greece’s predicament, and its resolution through (a) a two-step refinancing with bond accumulation and value injection and (b) collective action legislation and equivalent clauses. The experience suggests that a sovereign insolvency regime should grant priority to post-insolvency creditors over pre-insolvency creditors, should allow voting by classes, and should be conditional on the debtor’s continued compliance with reform and supervision.

Keywords: sovereign insolvency, collective action clause, cac, pari passu clause, Greek restructuring, sovereign rescheduling

Suggested Citation

Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L., Pyres, Haircuts, and CACs: Lessons from Greco-Multilateralism for Creditors (May 15, 2012). Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2012-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2046184 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2046184

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Robert H. McKinney School of Law ( email )

530 West New York Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
United States
317-274-1825 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nicholasgeorgakopoulos.org

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