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Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from Texas

16 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2012 Last revised: 4 Dec 2015

David A. Hyman

Georgetown University

Charles Silver

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Myungho Paik

Hanyang University - College of Policy Science

Date Written: February 14, 2014

Abstract

Does state tort reform affect physician supply? Tort reformers certainly believe so. Before Texas adopted tort reform in 2003, proponents claimed that physicians were deserting Texas in droves. After tort reform was enacted, proponents claimed there had been a dramatic increase in physicians moving to Texas due to the improved liability climate. We find no evidence to support either claim. Physician supply was not measurably stunted prior to reform, and it did not measurably improve after reform. This is true for all patient care physicians in Texas, high-malpractice-risk specialties, primary care physicians, and rural physicians.

Keywords: physician supply, malpractice, tort reform

Suggested Citation

Hyman, David A. and Silver, Charles and Black, Bernard S. and Paik, Myungho, Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from Texas (February 14, 2014). nearly final version, published in International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 42, 2015, pp. 203-218; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper 12-11; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS12-12; U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 225. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2047433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2047433

David A. Hyman

Georgetown University ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Charles M. Silver

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
512-232-1337 (Phone)
512-232-1372 (Fax)

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels
Belgium

Myungho Paik

Hanyang University - College of Policy Science ( email )

222 Wangsimni-ro Seongdong-gu
Seoul, 04763
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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