Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition

33 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2000  

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: undated

Abstract

Should (or when should) separate governments, including sub-units in a federal system, be encouraged to engage in tax competition rather than harmonizing their tax systems? The question is akin to asking when government should be used to solve collective action problems through coercion, and thus has no uniform answer. The paper discusses tariff examples where harmonization is preferable, Tiebout examples where competition is preferable, and then assesses the collision of these two lines of analysis with respect to tax haven and holiday jurisdictions that offer outside businesses or passive investors more favorable tax terms than those available to the locals.

JEL Classification: H00, H25, H41, H71, H73, H87, K34

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition (undated). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=204889 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204889

Daniel Shaviro (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
442
Rank
25,118
Abstract Views
1,801