15 Pages Posted: 2 May 2012
Date Written: May 1, 2012
The Common European Sales Law is designed as an optional instrument that European parties engaged in cross-border transactions could choose for their transactions in preference to national law. The goal is to increase cross-border transactions and perhaps to enhance European identity. But the CESL is unlikely to achieve these goals. It raises transaction costs while producing few if any benefits; it is unlikely to spur beneficial jurisdictional competition; its consumer protection provisions will make it unattractive for businesses; and its impact on European identity is likely to be small.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Posner, Eric A., The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition (May 1, 2012). University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 597. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2049594