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The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition

15 Pages Posted: 2 May 2012  

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: May 1, 2012

Abstract

The Common European Sales Law is designed as an optional instrument that European parties engaged in cross-border transactions could choose for their transactions in preference to national law. The goal is to increase cross-border transactions and perhaps to enhance European identity. But the CESL is unlikely to achieve these goals. It raises transaction costs while producing few if any benefits; it is unlikely to spur beneficial jurisdictional competition; its consumer protection provisions will make it unattractive for businesses; and its impact on European identity is likely to be small.

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A., The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition (May 1, 2012). University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 597. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2049594

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

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United States
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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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