Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence

GATE Working Paper No. 1207

48 Pages Posted: 25 May 2012 Last revised: 23 Dec 2013

Stéphane Robin

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Agnieszka Rusinowska

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 23, 2013

Abstract

We investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion conformity. Both individuals’ performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover. In some treatments, first movers can change their opinion after learning that held by the second mover. We find evidence of high ingratiation indices, as opinion conformity is rewarded. However, second movers reward conformity less when it is common knowledge that opinions can be manipulated strategically. Introducing a monetary cost for changing opinion reduces ingratiation. Introducing performance-related pay for the second mover makes ingratiation less rewarding but does not eliminate it completely. Reducing the noise in the measurement of ability has little effect.

Keywords: Ingratiation, opinion conformity, favoritism, discrimination, social distance, experiment

JEL Classification: C7, C92, D03, D86, M51

Suggested Citation

Robin, Stéphane and Rusinowska, Agnieszka and Villeval, Marie Claire, Ingratiation: Experimental Evidence (December 23, 2013). GATE Working Paper No. 1207. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2050437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2050437

Stéphane Robin

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Agnieszka Rusinowska (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/equipe/perso/villeval/villeval.html

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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