Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging: A Look from the New EU Directive on Public Procurement
Published in G Racca & C Yukins (eds), Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts (Brussles, Bruylant, 2014).
21 Pages Posted: 9 May 2012 Last revised: 26 Jan 2015
Date Written: April 1, 2014
The relevance of preventing and deterring instances of bidders’ collusion or bid rigging in public procurement has gained notorious attention in recent years, both due to the evident pressure on the public buyer to maximise value for money in times of crisis, and to the increased efforts and advocacy papers published by international organisations such as the OECD. Developing effective tools to prevent and deter collusion in public procurement can generate very relevant savings for the public purse and boost expenditure capabilities, as well as make a significant contribution to the promotion of effective market competition in sectors where procurement accumulates a significant volume of total purchases — to the indirect benefit of private buyers of the same or similar goods or services.
This paper describes the current situation, where bid rigging seems pervasive in public-buyer dominated industries (at least in the European Union) and then focuses on some of the instruments and provisions designed to prevent and deter bid rigging that have been included in the new Directive 2014/24 on public procurement (replacing current Directive 2004/18). The paper particularly focuses on the issues of contract division into lots and the rules controlling disqualification, suspension and debarment of competition law infringers, as two of the main tools that could effectively help prevent and deter collusion in the public procurement setting.
Keywords: Public procurement, collusion, bid rigging, division into lots, suspension, debarment
JEL Classification: H57, K21, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation