The Effect of Entry and Market Structure on Cellular Pricing Tactics
48 Pages Posted: 10 May 2012
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Effect of Entry and Market Structure on Cellular Pricing Tactics
Date Written: August 31, 2003
Abstract
We test the effect of entry on the tariff choices of incumbent cellular firms. We relate the change in the breadth of calling plans between 1996, when incumbents enjoyed a duopoly market, and 1998, when incumbents faced increased competition from personal communications services (PCS) firms. Entry by PCS competitors differed across geographic markets due to the number of licenses left undeveloped as a result of the bankruptcy of some of the auctions’ winning bidders and due to variation across markets in the time required to build a sufficiently large network of wireless infrastructure. We find that incumbents increased the number of calling plans more in markets with more entrants and that this effect is not explained by demographic characteristics of these markets or the geographic scope of the incumbents’ services.
Keywords: entry, market structure, cellular, price discrimination, nonlinear pricing, telecommunications
JEL Classification: L11, L13, L25, L96
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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