Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 827
31 Pages Posted: 14 May 2012
Date Written: May 14, 2012
Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust relations involve multiple agents. In an experiment, we study a new setting called Collective Trust Game where there are multiple trustees, who may have an incentive to coordinate their actions. Trustworthiness has also a strategic motivation, and the trusters' decision depends upon their beliefs about the predominant convention with regard to trustworthiness. In this respect, the Collective Trust Games offers a richer pattern of behavior than dyadic games. We report that the levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when strategic motivations are present rather than not. Higher levels of trustworthiness also led to higher levels of trust. Moreover, strategic motives appear as a major drive for trustees, comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.
Keywords: trust game, coordination, inequality aversion, reciprocity, experiments
JEL Classification: C92, C72, D03
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bigoni, Maria and Bortolotti, Stefania and Casari, Marco and Gambetta, Diego, Trustworthy by Convention (May 14, 2012). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 827. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2057607 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2057607