Automatic Continuing Resolutions: A Cure Worse than the Ailment

6 Pages Posted: 14 May 2012

See all articles by Philip J. Candreva

Philip J. Candreva

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School; Monterey College of Law

Date Written: May 14, 2012

Abstract

This essay considers statutory proposals to create an automatic continuing resolution mechanism to avoid government shutdowns from the perspectives of public management, political science, and law. It concludes that such a mechanism is ill-advised because of the policy implications of changes to incentive structures.

Keywords: automatic continuing resolution, continuing resolution, appropriation, administrative law, government shutdown

JEL Classification: E61, H61, K23

Suggested Citation

Candreva, Philip J., Automatic Continuing Resolutions: A Cure Worse than the Ailment (May 14, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2059045 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2059045

Philip J. Candreva (Contact Author)

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School ( email )

1 University Circle
Monterey, CA 93943-5001
United States
831-656-2884 (Phone)

Monterey College of Law ( email )

100 COL DURHAM STREET
SEASIDE, CA 93955
United States

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